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SUPREME COURT RESPONSIVENESS: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE 
VOTING BEHAVIOR AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
Michael Browning 
Abstract: This study attempts to explain why the Supreme Court responds to public mood by analyzing 
individual justice liberalism and comparing it to public liberalism between the years of1970 and 2001. 
Three theories suggesting why the Court may respond to public opinion are discussed, including the 
replacement, political adjustment, and the attitude change hypotheses. The method of using Court 
reversals to determine the ideology of the Court is presented and implemented. Along with ideology and 
the public mood, the overall Court mood is used as an independent variable to explain the driving force 
behind changes in individual justices' voting behavior. The study concludes that the Court mood is the 
strongest and most significant factor in changes in judicial voting behavior, while public opinion and 
ideology explain little to none of the variance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's role in American society is one of the essential parts of the checks 
and balances of the United States government. The lifetime tenure of justices frees them from 
the tyranny of public mood during election seasons and allows them to decide cases on the 
basis of the law rather than public preferences. In Federalist Paper No.7S, Alexander Hamilton 
argued that if periodic instead of lifetime appointments were made, the temptation would be 
too great to consult popularity rather than the Constitution and the laws. In Federalist Paper 
No.76, Hamilton also described the Court as lithe least dangerous branch" because of its 
inability to make laws and policies of its own. It is also arguably the least democratic branch, 
because it is the most independent branch. However, despite the Court's immunity from public 
opinion due to the process of appointments, as opposed to elections, evidence suggests the 
Court still regularly decides in line with public opinion. William Mishler, Reginald Sheehan1, 
Kevin McGuire, and James Stimson2 analyze the relationship between public opinion and the 
Supreme Court using Stimson's index of public mood from 1992 and 1999, respectively. In their 
analyses, Mishler and Sheehan find that the Supreme Court responds to public opinion at a lag 
of five years with an R-squared of .66, significant at the .01 level. McGuire and Stimson find a 
relationship at a lag of one year with an R squared of .71, significant at the .05 level. Given these 
data, public opinion has an influence on the Court, but because lifetime appointments separate 
the justices from direct accountability to public opinion, there must be other explanations as to 
why public opinion affects the Court. 
THEORIES OF RESPONSIVENESS 
To best explain how the Supreme Court might be affected by public opinion, three 
theories are generally used. The Dahl-Funston hypothesis, also known as "replacement 
hypothesis," articulates that because the president and senators' beliefs and positions are in line 
1 Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 1994; 1996. 
2 Stimson and McGuire 2004. 
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with the public mood when elected, their choices for justices are also likely to reflect that mood. 
Dahl argues that a president generally gets to appoint two justices for every four years spent in 
office, which can effectively "tip the balance on the normally divided Court."3 Mishler and 
Sheehan note that this theory is consistent with the attitudinal model of judicial decision 
making which states that justices assume the bench with ideologies and beliefs that typically 
remain constant throughout their tenure. 4 
The political adjustment hypothesis is much more direct, as it states that justices might 
purposefully change or tweak their positions in order to bring their decisions in line with the 
public mood. Political adjustment suggests that justices are concerned with the enforcement of 
their decisions. This hypothesis is best summed up by Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr. 
Frankfurter wrote "The Court's authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword -
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."s 
The " attitude change hypothesis" is the final of the standard three theories on court­
public relations. It conflicts with the attitudinal model in that it specifically theorizes that a 
justice's personal ideology might change in time to fit with broad and enduring changes in 
public opinion. Judges, like other members of society, are affected by societal norms, even if 
they are unaware of society's effects on them. Mishler and Sheehan acknowledge that the 
attitude change hypothesis cannot reliably be tested because there are no independent measures 
of social change, and McGuire and Stimson do not even theorize on the matter, preferring to 
test the replacement and political adjustment hypotheses instead.6 
THEORIES OF MEASURES 
McGuire and Stimson set up their empirical analysis by using Stimson's 1999 index of 
public mood as the independent variable and the Supreme Court's liberalism as the dependent 
variable? However, they identify a unique problem with analyzing all of the Court's cases as 
an indicator of the Court's ideology, citing McGuire, Smith and Caldeira8 in their theory 
explaining why reversals provide better indicators of the Court's ideology. 
The reversal hypothesis relies on the idea that lower courts' decisions " center around the 
Supreme Court's ideal." This idea states that because lower courts are restricted by stare decisis, 
they make decisions that attempt to reflect policy outlined in Supreme Court precedents.9 This 
"vertical stare decisis" causes lower court decisions to cluster around the moderate center of the 
Court's known preferences. Potential litigants estimate their chances of winning given these 
known preferences, and decide to seek certiorari based on those chances. If the Supreme Court 
is perceived as conservative, more liberal lower court decisions will be considered too liberal for 
3 Dahl 1957, quoted in Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 171 .  
4 Mishler and Sheehan 1996. 
S Baker v. Carr 1962, quoted in Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 173. 
6 Mishler and Sheehan 1996; McGuire and Stimson 2004. 
7 McGuire and Stimson 2004. 
8 McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira 2004. 
9 Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994. 
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the Court. In other words, there would be more conservative petitioners making accurate (and 
inaccurate) estimates as to their likelihood of winning at the Supreme Court level. These 
accurate estimates become reversals, while the inaccurate estimates become affirmances. 
McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera write that " as the Court becomes more conservative, there are 
more liberal policies that will be reversed by the justices and fewer conservative lower court 
decisions that they will reject."lO Thus the reversals, or the accurate estimates, reflect where the 
Court lies ideologically, while the inaccurate estimates portray an incorrect image. Tests of the 
reversal hypothesis reveal that when using only reversals, the Court appears to be liberal 
through the Warren Court and then more conservative through the Burger and Rehnquist 
courts, until Clinton's appointments brought the Court back towards a moderate center. Using 
only affirmances showed close to the opposite, suggesting that the Warren years were very 
conservative years for the Court, something widely known to be untrue. The reversal model 
also explains 82 % of the variance in the ideological composition of decisions, where the 
standard model using both reversals and affirmances only accounted for 70% .11 
McGuire and Stimson also test the reversal hypothesis. Their data support their 
hypothesis, showing affirmances with an R squared of .03, reversals with .60 and all cases with 
.57.12 The most compelling results of their research show significantly strengthened 
relationships between Court composition/public opinion and the liberalism of Court outcomes 
when using reversals as opposed to all the cases. Given the reversal hypothesis, there is a 
strong argument that using both affirmances and reversals contaminates models attempting to 
illustrate the liberalism of Supreme Court decisions, and that previous studies of the Court may 
have underestimated the effect of public opinion.l3 
Another research issue concerns the response time of the Court to public opinion. 
Mishler and Sheehan predict a lag in the evidence of a response to public opinion in the Court's 
decisions because replacing justices takes time, as does political adjustment.l4 According to 
their theory, justices would only logically respond to enduring shifts of public opinion. 
Norpoth and Segal criticize the lag theory, stating that "if the Court only acts on change that has 
endured, their decisions should be influenced by contemporaneous as well as lagged public 
opinion. illS The time lag concern is worth discussing because Mishler and Sheehan show that 
public opinion is "significantly and positively correlated with trends in the Court's decisions at 
a lag of five years; and the relationship approaches significance at t+3 as well."l6 The absence of 
evidence of a lag at one year, two years, and four years may be attributed to the short length of 
the time series used. In reply to Norpoth and Segars concern that justices should be affected by 
contemporaneous opinion, Mishler and Sheehan respond that justices may only respond to 
10 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004, 7. 
11 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004. 
12 McGuire and Stimson 2004. 
13 McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera 2004, 16-17. 
14 Mishler and Sheehan 1993. 
15 Norpoth and Segal 1994, 712. 
16 Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 92. 
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durable shifts in public opinion, something that contemporaneous opinion has not yet had time 
to prove. They expand their theory to explain a small impact of public opinion in the first year 
that will "gradually increase over time before ending or leveling off at some impossible-to­
predict future point."17 Their results support this theory. 
THEORIES REGARDING INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES 
Mishler and Sheehan also examine the issue at an individual level. They look at 
Supreme Court justices in a psychological manner, reasoning that attitudes are affected by 
personally held beliefs, the strength of those beliefs, how they are expected to behave, and 
societal norms.18 Their hypothesis states that justices with more extreme ideologies will be less 
likely to move to the center (public opinion), while justices who are already moderate will be 
more likely to move one way or the other. They use yearly data from the Supreme Court Data 
Base from 1953 - 1992, analyzing only justices who served for 12 years or longer .. Evaluating the 
percentage of liberal votes cast by each justice each year, they compare it to Stimson's public 
mood index from 1991. Their analysis supports their hypothesis, showing "that moderate 
justices are more consistently responsive to fluctuations in the public mood than either liberal or 
conservative justices."19 
All three analyses by Mishler and Sheehan20 and the analysis by McGuire and Stimson 
show that decisions of the Court diverge from public opinion around 1980. 21 This could be 
caused by a sharp increase in liberal public mood coupled with several increasingly moderate to 
conservative appointments to the Supreme Court that began in the Reagan years and continued 
through Bush Sr., thus affecting the balance of the Court.22 This would be consistent with the 
replacement hypothesis as well as Mishler and Sheehan's theory that moderate justices are the 
swing votes that cause the Court to follow public opinion.23 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
In approaching my analysis of individual Supreme Court justices, I start by questioning 
if Supreme Court decisions between the years of 1970 and 2001 reflect long-term public opinion 
trends. Given that they do, are moderate justices providing swing votes that cause Supreme 
Court decisions to follow public opinion? 
The hypothesis stating that the Supreme Court follows public opinion due to moderate 
justices is based on the theories of Mishler and Sheehan that state that moderate justices are 
more likely to be affected and swayed by public mood than more ideologically extreme justices. 
17 Mishler and Sheehan 1994, 718. 
18 Mishler and Sheehan 1996. 
19 Ibid., 189. 
20 Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 1994; 1996. 
21 McGuire and Stimson 2004. 
22 Mishler and Sheehan 1993. 
23 Mishler and Sheehan 1996. 
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As a result, a balanced Court will appear to follow public opinion rather closely in its decisions, 
because the moderate justices swing the decision in the direction of the public mood.24 I expect 
the empirical evidence between 1970 and 2001 to support the hypothesis that as the Court 
becomes ideologically imbalanced, its decisions will stray from public opinion. 
MEASURES 
Mishler and Sheehan observe the relationship between public opinion and Supreme 
Court decisions by individually examining each of the nine seats on the Supreme Court 
between 1953 and 1992. They measure each justice's ideology by doing a content analysis on 
newspaper editorials at the time of the justice's nomination to the Supreme Court. They code 
each justice as either extremely conservative (-1), moderate (0), or extremely liberal (1) and sum 
the scores to determine the ideological balance of the Supreme Court for each year. This 
method of coding efficiently identifies the ideology of the Court, but it makes a critical error by 
assuming that a justice's ideology stays the same throughout their tenure. Two justices within 
the scope of my study, Justices Blackmun and White, disprove that theory altogether. In the 
model, ideology scores for each justice were calculated by using a moving average of their 
liberalism scores from their previous three years on the Court. 
Mishler and Sheehan also limit their study to justices who served a minimum of twelve 
years, presumably because twelve years provides a sufficient amount of time to see how the 
justice's ideology reflected in his or her decisions. Because of the already limited number of 
cases, I decided to use all justices who served between 1970 and 2001. Where multiple 
regression models turned up insignificant results, bivariate correlation was used as an alternate 
attempt at observing the relationship. 
To determine the ideology of Supreme Court decisions, Mishler and Sheehan use the 
Supreme Court Database and calculate the percentage of liberal votes cast by the justice in 
question for each year.25 They exclude per curium opinions, memoranda, and judicial power 
decisions because of the difficulty in coding the ideological direction of a decision or the routine 
nature of these types of decisions. I will be using the Supreme Court Database, which provides 
the data for each justice's vote as well as the vote's ideological identification. I will also include 
all decisions that could be coded, as some per curium opinions do have a discernable 
ideological direction. The database codes votes and decisions as liberal if, in criminal 
procedure, First Amendment, civil rights or due process cases, the vote is pro-individual, pro­
affirmative action, pro-female in abortion, or pro-civil liberties, to name a few. In economics or 
union cases, liberal votes and decisions are pro-union, pro-debtor, anti-business, or pro­
consumer, etc. Conservative votes and decisions are coded as the opposites of the liberal votes. 
Exact lists of coding criteria are found in the Supreme Court Database codebook. 
To create a liberalism score for each justice, the votes were tallied for each year of their 
tenure. The total liberal votes were then divided by the total number of cases in which an 
24 Mishler and Sheehan 1996. 
25 Ibid. 
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ideological direction was discernable, producing a justice liberalism score for that year. The 
restrictions on this model were that the votes were only tallied from reversals, as they are a 
better indicator of a justice's ideology.26 
In addition to concerns about Court ideology, another measurement issue deals with the 
independent variable of public mood, which has proved a challenge to measure accurately 
throughout much of the literature. James Stimson solves this seemingly daunting task with his 
public mood index. His index is available on his website, and many scholars, including those 
cited in this study, rely on it as a dependable indicator of the liberalism of public opinion on a 
yearly basis. 
With the variables of individual justices' ideologies, the overall Court's ideology, and 
the public's overall political mood affecting the ideological direction of Supreme Court 
decisions between 1970 and 2001, the model will attempt to establish a nuanced analysis of how 
individual justices make their decisions. It should be noted that 2001 provides a good stopping 
point because Stimson's standard error on his public policy mood index gets exponentially 
larger in more recent years. The independent variables for each individual justice are the 
Court's mood, the individual justice's ideology, and the public's mood. The dependent variable 
is the justice's liberalism score for each year he or she served on the Court. 
Table 1 below represents the overall model strength for each of the time lags considered 
in the study. Figure 1 graphically depicts the relationship between the Court mood and public 
opinion over time. 
Table 1: Overall Model Strength for Time-Lagged Models 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
N 
R I' I Time +1 I ea time 
Y ears 
.550 .510 
.001 .003 
32 32 
26 McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira 2004. 
Time+2 
Years 
.504 
.003 
32 
I Time +3 I Time+4 I Time+5 Years Years Years 
.552 .370 .322 
.001 .037 .072 
32 32 32 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
In order to find the point at which justices can be expected to respond to public mood, 
models for the current year and five time lags were run for the entire Court mood. Bivariate 
correlation models show that the Court responds to public mood immediately (realtime) and 
also at time lags of one, two, and three years. While the four year lag was also significant, it was 
less so, and the five year lag did not return any significant results. 
This is not surprising, as justices may be responding both to immediate public trends as 
well as prolonged public changes in mood, which fits with the argument of Norpoth and Segal. 
The study continued by focusing on realtime as well as the three year lag because they were the 
most statistically significant with the strongest correlations to public mood. 
Models were run testing the justices' liberalism scores against public mood in realtime 
and at a lag of three years. The justices' ideology and the Court's overall mood were used as 
controls. As mentioned before, ideology was calculated using a moving average from the votes 
of the previous three years. This measure of ideology accounts for the theory being tested here: 
that justices do not make decisions based off of a solid, unchanging ideology. Instead, my 
ideology measure allows for a changing judicial attitude. By using an average of the previous 
three years, the ideology score balances out what might be considered outlier years when the 
docket contained uncommon numbers of certain types of cases. In the years examined, 1970 
through 2001, eighty percent of cases concerned either criminal procedure, civil rights, first 
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amendment, economic activity, or judicial power. Of these, 22% were criminal procedure, 19% 
were civil rights, 9% were First Amendment, 18% were economic activity, and 13% were judicial 
power. This balance of law issues allows the study to accurately examine the ideology of each 
justiceP 
The purpose of the model was to find out which justices responded to public opinion, 
and thus affected the outcome of the Court's decisions, causing the overall Court mood to 
follow public opinion. The results, however, did not follow that line of logic. Very few of the 
justices showed any significant correlation with public opinion at all. Those who did, Justice 
Souter in realtime, and Justices Blackmun and Burger at a three year lag, reacted by moving 
away from public opinion, rather than parallel to it. In the cases of Blackmun and Burger, 
ideology turned out to be a strong driving force, with Betas of .758 and .395 respectively. When 
it comes to the moderate justice thesis, this model failed to show a strong correlation with 
public opinion. 
Findings concerning ideology were also surprising, as this is not typically a dominant 
factor in justices' votes. The attitudinal model of judicial decision making states that justices 
make decisions based off of attitudes or ideologies that remain the same throughout their 
tenure. However, the results of this model tell quite a different story. After observing changes 
in justices' liberalism scores from year to year, the model was designed to assume that the 
attitudinal model was partially incorrect, instead asserting that justices' ideologies actually do 
change throughout their tenure. Room was made for this hypothesis by calculating the justice 
ideology independent variable as a moving average of previous years' votes. Even with this 
moving ideology variable, ideology only appeared to significantly affect Justice Blackmun's 
votes in realtime and T+3 (with strong Betas of .818 and .758 respectively), and Chief Justices 
Burger and Rehnquist in T+3 (with weaker Betas of .395 and .304, respectively) . Because Justice 
Blackmun started his tenure conservatively in the 1970s and ended quite liberally during the 
1980s, the resulting ideological shift logically accounts for the change in his voting behavior 
better than public mood, even though public liberalism declined during the 70s and increased 
during the 80s. In addition, though his voting record correlated with public mood at T+3, it did 
so in a negative direction (Beta of -.430) . This negative correlation might exist because his shift 
in liberalism is actually quite a bit more dramatic than the public's, which usually tends to be 
slow and even. Justices Burger and Rehnquist's ideologies, on the other hand, correlate 
positively with their voting records. It may be possible that their role as Chief Justice has 
something to do with their ideologies playing into their decisions more than the other justices, 
but that hypothesis could only be addressed in another study. 
The results show that the strongest variable affecting justice's votes was the Court's 
overall mood. Aside from Breyer and Souter's bivariate correlation exceptions (most likely due 
to their small sample sizes of years on the Court), Court mood came in as the strongest 
27 Further study has shown this statement to be incorrect. Data shows that justices vote with different 
ideologies depending on the law issue at hand. By aggregating all of the issues, this study has produced 
an inaccurate measure of the justices' ideologies. See 2011 research by Michael Browning for a resolution 
of this issue. 
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significant independent variables affecting each justices' votes. This is to be partly expected, as 
Court decisions are composed of justice's votes, but given that there are nine justices, it is 
noteworthy that overall Court mood is such a strong force on an individual justice's vote 
regardless of ideology. A likely explanation for the importance of Court mood is that as the 
overall mood of the Court shifts to accommodate public opinion, justices adjust their vote in 
order to stay relevant. This can especially be seen in the results for some of the moderate 
justices (who are potential swing votes) at a three year lag, namely O'Conner, Kennedy, and 
Powell. Burger is even surprisingly affected by the overall Court mood, suggesting that even 
ideologically extreme justices care about their relevance to the Court. 
While the results of the model do not point to individual justices as the reason behind 
the Court's correlation with public opinion, they do suggest that the composition of the Court is 
important. However, the variance in individual justices' voting behavior contradicts parts of 
the attitudinal model by suggesting that justices change their votes to be in line with the overall 
mood of the Court. This casts some doubt on the replacement hypothesis as the sole 
explanation for why the Supreme Court tends to correlate with public opinion. If the 
replacement hypothesis affected Supreme Court voting in any significant way, we would not 
see much of a change in voting behavior during the 11 year period between 1994 and 2005 when 
the composition of the Court did not change at all. The results of this model (from 1994-2001) 
do not show a static Court, but instead show an almost random pattern during those years. The 
small sample size restricts the conclusions that can be made from this observation, but it does 
suggest that there is more to be explained concerning how the Supreme Court behaves as an 
institution. The results of this model suggest a combination of rational choices made by 
individual justices, while the overall Court follows the theory of political adjustment with 
occasional shifts that occur when justices are sometimes replaced by their ideological opposites. 
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Model and 
Independent N 
Variables 
Individual 
Justice 
Marshallt 21 
Stevens 27 
Brennan 23 
Breyert 8 
Soutert 12 
Ginsburg 9 
Blackmun 24 
White 23 
O'Conner 21 
Kennedy 15 
Burger 16 
Powell 16 
Stewart 11 
Rehnquist 30 
Scalia 16 
Thomast 11 
Table 2: Realtime Multiple Regression Model 
Dependent Variable: Individual Justices' Voting Patterns 
Adjusted. Overall Court Ct Md. Ideology Id. Std. Model Mood Std. R- Square Sig. (Sig.):j: Error:j: 
(Sig.) Error 
.000 
.502* .162 
(.02) (.451) 
.546* .014 
.544** 
.216 
.270 
(.086) .153 (.002) 
.375 
.489* 
(.040) 
.155 
-.200 
(.423) .315 
.518 -.047 
.033 
(.188) (.911) 
.513* .010 
.899** 
.320 
.067 
(.818) 
.476 
(.009) 
.807*** .000 
.906* -.285 
(.045) 
.407 
(.165) .308 
.000 
.534*** 
.772*** 
(000) 
.172 
.818*** 
(.000) 
.149 
.660*** .000 
.914*** 
.155 
.083 
(.539) 
.170 
(.000) 
.723** .003 
.853*** 
(.000) 
.152 
-.002 
(.988) .171 
.636*** .000 
.842*** .076 
(.000) 
.172 
(.667) .370 
.000 
.993*** 
. 776*** 
(.000) 
.167 
.183 
(.313) 
.268 
.881** .007 
.945*** 
(.000) 
.125 
.247 
(.142) .158 
.717*** .000 
.912** 
(.007) 
.225 
-.539 
(.130) 
.404 
.550** .001 
.617*** 
.170 
.219 
(.110) 
.176 
(.000) 
.036 
.832*** 
.698* 
(.000) 
.160 
.251 
(.112) .300 
.548 
.705* -.279 
(.021) 
.481 
(.298) 
.499 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.OOl 
Public 
Mood 
(Sig.) 
.437* 
(.033) 
.135 
(.357) 
.399 
(.160) 
.509 
(.197) 
-.849* 
(.026) 
-.014 
(.970) 
-.221 
(.141) 
-.203 
(.207) 
.056 
(.664) 
.058 
(.741) 
-.228 
(.355) 
-.221 
(.235) 
.387 
(.303) 
.115 
(.422) 
.210 
(.171) 
.281 
(.338) 
tMultiple Regression model insignificant, results displayed are from bivariate correlation, 
:j: Variable Betas measured with Pearson Correlation; Standard Error measured with F-Test. 
PM 
Std. 
Error 
.479 
.494 
.984 
2.337 
.528 
.388 
.352 
.449 
.608 
.507 
.926 
.423 
.389 
1 .408 
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Model and 
Independent N 
Variables 
Individual 
Justice 
Marshallt 21 
Stevens 27 
Brennan 23 
Breyert 8 
Soutert 12 
Ginsburg 9 
Blackmun 24 
White 23 
O'Conner 21 
Kennedy 15 
Burger 16 
Powell 16 
Stewart 11 
Rehnquist 30 
Scalia 16 
Thomast 11 
Table 3: Time +3 Years Multiple Regression Model 
Dependent Variable: Individual Justices' Voting Patterns 
Adjusted. Overall Court Ct Md. Ideology Id. Std. Model Mood Std. R- Square Sig. (Sig.):j: Error:j: 
(Sig.) Error 
.502* .162 
(.020) (.451) 
.542** .258 .563*** .000 (.001) .208 (.094) .151 
.594* -.062 .293* .036 (.032) .179 (.865) .464 
.518 -.047 
(.188) (.911) 
.364 .209 
(.245) (.515) 
.943** -.177 .836** .007 (.002) .179 (.387) .326 
.690*** .758*** .868*** .000 (.000) .135 (.000) .097 
.662** -.122 .668*** .000 (.001) .156 (.510) .231 
.844*** -.062 .724*** .000 (.000) .157 (.724) .236 
.792** .016 .652** .002 (.001) .183 (.925) .363 
1.08*** .395* .855*** .000 (.000) .117 (.026) .240 
.867*** .070 .867*** .000 (.000) .119 (.732) .199 
1.02** -.299 .668* .013 (.005) .236 (.335) .371 
.721*** .304* .562*** .000 (.000) .165 (.039) .186 
.853** .242 .645** .001 (.001) .203 (.241) .402 
.783** -.026 
(.004) (.940) 
*p<.05, **p<.Ol, ***p<.OOl 
Public 
Mood 
(Sig.) 
.092 
(.692) 
.185 
(.193) 
.105 
(.804) 
-.324 
(.434) 
-.464 
(.129) 
-.179 
(.391) 
-.430*** 
(.000) 
.325 
(.153) 
.096 
(.620) 
.143 
(.440) 
-.523** 
(.016) 
.051 
(.797) 
.021 
(.946) 
-.177 
(.247) 
.036 
(.864) 
.031 
(.927) 
tMultiple Regression model insignificant, results displayed are from bivariate correlation, 
:j: Variable Betas measured with Pearson Correlation; Standard Error measured with F-Test. 
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PM 
Std. 
Error 
.433 
.679 
.524 
.330 
.501 
.450 
.489 
.380 
.449 
.953 
.408 
.556 
12 RES PUBLICA 
CONCLUSIONS 
While this study failed to explain the reason that the Supreme Court follows public 
mood, it did bring to light a reason why it does not. Given the results of this study, it can be 
asserted that moderate justices are no more likely to heed public mood than extreme ideological 
justices, or that extreme ideological justices may pay attention to public opinion in a negative 
way (see Burger, T+3). What remains to be seen is how the Supreme Court follows public 
opinion overall without any of the individual justices being significantly affected by the public 
mood. Several explanations exist, including the possibility that while none of the justices are 
significantly affected, there is enough variation in the group that the seemingly random back 
and forth movements of the justices actually amount to an adherence to public mood. Yet 
another possibility is that the cases and votes in this study were not broken down by issue.28 
Some justices' ideologies can change significantly depending on the issue, and a more careful 
study may show that some individual justices actually do follow public opinion on certain 
issues that are important to the American public. Finally, this study was restricted by a small 
number of cases, and while the liberalism scores for each justice are seemingly accurate, the 
number of years for some justices on the bench were simply too few to study. Despite these 
limitations, this study achieved significant results and was able to verify that the overall mood 
of the Court is a powerful factor in judicial decision making. Further research into voting 
blocks, as well as Court leadership and swing voting, may reveal why the Supreme Court 
correlates strongly with the overall public mood and whether or not it falls in line with the 
political adjustment hypothesis. 
28 See author's 2011 work for testing of this hypothesis. 
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